We derive a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel with channel state information at the transmitter which matches the general upper bound on the secrecy capacity of general compound wiretap channels given by Liang et al. and thus establishing a full coding theorem in this case. We achieve this with a stronger secrecy criterion and the maximum error probability criterion, and with a decoder that is robust against the effect of randomisation in the encoding. This relieves us from the need of decoding the randomisation parameter which is in general not possible within this model. Moreover we prove a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel without channel state information and derive a multi-letter expression for the capacity in this communication scenario.
INTRODUCTION
Compound wiretap channels are among the simplest non-trivial models incorporating the requirement of security against a potential eavesdropper while at the same time the legitimate users suffer from channel uncertainty. They may be considered therefore as a starting point for theoretical investigation tending towards applications, for example, in wireless systems, a fact explaining an alive research activity in this area in recent years (cf. [1] , [2] and references therein). In this article we give capacity results for different scenarios of channel state information under a strong secrecy criterion and the maximum error probability criterion. In a more recent work [3] the authors make use of these results to derive capacity results for arbitrarily varying wiretap channels, a more realistic communication model, which, apart from eavesdropping, takes into account an active adversarial jamming situation. In this paper we consider finite families of pairs of channels W = {(W t , V t ) : t = 1, . . . , T } with common input alphabet and possibly different output alphabets. The legitimate users control W t and the eavesdropper observes the output of V t . We will be dealing with two communication scenarios. In the first one the transmitter is informed about the index t (channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter) while in the second the transmitter has no information about that index at all (no CSI). In both scenarios the eavesdropper knows and the legitimate receiver does not know the channel state. This setup is a generalisation of Wyner's [4] wiretap channel. Along the way we will comment what our results look like when applied to widely used class of models of the form W = {(W t , V s ) : t = 1, . . . , T, s = 1, . . . , S} with T = S which are special cases of the model we are dealing with in this paper. Our contributions are summarised as follows: In [1] a general upper bound on the capacity of compound wiretap channel as the minimum secrecy capacity of the involved wiretap channels was given. We prove in Section 3.2 that the models whose secrecy capacity matches this upper bound contain all compound wiretap channels with CSI at the transmitter. At the same time we achieve this bound with a substantially stronger security criterion employed already in [5] , [6] , [7] , and [8] . Indeed, our security proof follows closely that developed in [8] for single wiretap channel with classical input and quantum output. In order to achieve secrecy we follow the common approach according to which randomised encoding is a permissible operation. Usually , the legitimate decoder can decode the sent codeword that represents both the message to be transmitted and the outcome of the random experiment as well. However, in the case of compound wiretap channel with CSI at the transmitter this strategy does not work as is illustrated by an example in Section 4.1. We resolve this difficulty by developing a decoding strategy which is independent of the particular channel realisation and is insensitive to randomisation while decoding just at the optimal secrecy rate for all channels {W t : t = 1, . . . , T } simultaneously.
Moreover, a slight modification of our proofs allows us to determine the capacity of the compound wiretap channel without CSI by a (non-computable) multi-letter expression. This is content of Section 3.3. We should mention, however, that the traditional proof strategy of sending the pair consisting of message and randomisation parameter to the legitimate receiver works as well in the case where the transmitter has no CSI. The lower bound on the secrecy capacity, we proofed under the strong secrecy criterion, we have used for parts of the secrecy results for arbitrarily varying wiretap channels in [3] . The lower bound on the secrecy capacity as well the as the multi-letter expression were given earlier in [1] respective in [2] for weaker secrecy criteria but without detailed proofs. In Section 4.2 we give an example of compound wiretap channel such that both the set of channels to the legitimate receiver and to the eavesdropper are convex but whose secrecy capacities with CSI and without CSI at the transmitter are different. Indeed the former is positive while the latter is equal to 0. Section 3.4 is devoted to the practically important model W = {(W t , V s ) : t = 1, . . . , T, s = 1, . . . , S} with the assumption that the transmitter has CSI for the T -part but has no CSI for the S-part of the channel. Here again we provide a multi-letter expression for the capacity. Additionally, we give a computable description of the secrecy capacity in the case where the channels to the eavesdropper are degraded versions of those to the legitimate receiver. Our results are easily extended to arbitrary sets (even uncountable) of wiretap channels via standard approximation techniques [9] .
COMPOUND WIRETAP CHANNELS

Definitions
Let A, B, C be finite sets and θ = {1, . . . , T } an index set. We consider two families of channels W t : A → P(B) 1 , V t : A → P(C), t ∈ θ, which we collectively abbreviate by W and call the compound wiretap channel generated by the given families of channels. Here the first family represents the communication link to the legitimate receiver while the output of the latter is under control of the eavesdropper. In the rest of the paper expressions like W ⊗n t or V ⊗n t stand for the n-th memoryless extension of the stochastic matrices W t , V t . An (n, J n ) code for the compound wiretap channel W consists of a stochastic encoder E : J n → P(A n ) (a stochastic matrix) with a message set J n := {1, . . . , J n } and a collection of mutually disjoint decoding sets {D j ⊂ B n : j ∈ J n }. The maximum error probability of a (n, J n ) code C n is given by
I.e. neither the sender nor the receiver have CSI.
If channel state information is available at the transmitter the notion of (n, J n ) code is modified in that the encoding may depend on the channel index while the decoding sets remain universal, i.e. independent of the channel index t. The probability of error in (1) changes to
We assume throughout the paper that the eavesdropper always knows which channel is in use.
Definition 2.1. A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the compound wiretap channel W with or without CSI respectively if there is a sequence (C n ) n∈N of (n, J n ) codes such that
where J is a uniformly distributed random variable taking values in J n and Z n t are the resulting random variables at the output of eavesdropper's channel V ⊗n t . The secrecy capacity in either scenario is given by the largest achievable secrecy rate and is denoted by C S (W) and C S,CSI (W).
Hints on operational meaning of strong secrecy
A weaker and widely used security criterion is obtained if we replace (2) by lim n→∞ max t∈θ 1 n I(J; Z n t ) = 0. We prefer to follow [5] , [7] , and [8] and require the validity of (2) . A nice discussion on interrelation of several secrecy criteria is contained in [2] . We confine ourselves to giving some hints on the operational meaning of the requirement (2) . To this end we restrict our attention to the case where the transmitter has no CSI in order to simplify our notation. The case of compound wiretap channel with CSI at the transmitter can be treated accordingly. Set
Then Pinsker's inequality implies that
with a positive universal constant c, where || · || is the variational distance. Suppose that the eavesdropper chooses for each t ∈ θ decoding sets {K j,t ⊂ C n : j ∈ J n } with C n = j∈Jn K j,t . We will lower bound the average error probability (and consequently the maximum error probability) for every choice of the decoding rule the eavesdropper might make. Set
where in the first and the third line we have used the fact that the sets {j} × K any j ∈ J n there is a subset K j,t ⊂ C n on the eavesdropper's output alphabet where now the sets K j,t need not necessarily be mutually disjoint. With E : J n → P(A n ) being the stochastic encoder used to transmit messages to the legitimate receiver we can write down the identification errors of first and second kind (cf. [10] for further explanation of this code concept) for the eavesdropper's channel as
and
for j, i ∈ J n , i = j. One possible interpretation of this attack, again based on [10] , is that on the eavesdropper's side of the channel there are persons F 1 , . . . , F Jn observing the output of the channel. The sole interest of F j is whether or not the message j has been sent to the legitimate receiver. Thus F j performs the hypothesis test represented by K j,t based on his/her knowledge of t ∈ θ and (5), (6) are just the errors of the first resp. second kind for that hypothesis test. Let us define for j ∈ J n g(j, t) :=
which is a number in [0, 2]. Notice that if
or there is at least one i = j with
or both, so that no reliable identification of message j can be guaranteed. We show now that under assumption of (2) we have
so that at most a fraction
This last assertion is readily seen from (7) by applying Markov's inequality to the set
In order to prove (7), note that for any t ∈ θ
where in the third line we have used (3) and in the fourth we inserted p J ({j} c ) =
Jn . Besides the attempts of the eavesdropper to decode or identify messages we can introduce attacks corresponding to each communication task introduced in [11] . It would be interesting, not only from the mathematical point of view, to see against which of them and to what extent secrecy can be guaranteed by the condition (2).
CAPACITY RESULTS
Preliminaries
In what follows we use the notation as well as some properties of typical and conditionally typical sequences from [12] . For p ∈ P(A), W : A → P(B), x n ∈ A n , and δ > 0 we denote by T n p,δ the set of typical sequences and by T n W,δ (x n ) the set of conditionally typical sequences given x n in the sense of [12] . The basic properties of these sets that are needed in the sequel are summarised in the following three lemmata.
Lemma 3.1. Fixing δ > 0, for every p ∈ P(A) and W : A → P(B) we have
for all x n ∈ A n with c = 1/(2 ln 2). In particular, there is n 0 ∈ N such that for each δ > 0 and p ∈ P(A), W : A → P(B) and n > n 0
holds with c ′ = c 2 . Proof. Standard Bernstein-Sanov trick using the properties of types from [12] and Pinsker's inequality. The details can be found in [13] and references therein for example.
Recall that for p ∈ P(A) and W : A → P(B), pW ∈ P(B) denotes the output distribution generated by p and W and that x n ∈ T n p,δ and y
hold where
Proof. Cf. [12] .
In addition we need a further lemma which will be used to determine the rates at which reliable transmission to the legitimate receiver is possible. Lemma 3.3. Let p,p ∈ P(A) and two stochastic matrices W, W : A → P(B) be given. Further let q ∈ P(B) be the output distribution generated by p and W . Fix δ ∈ (0,
for allx n ∈ T ñ p,δ holds for a universal f (δ) > 0 and lim δ→0 f (δ) = 0. Proof. The proof can be found in [13] but is given here for the sake of completeness. Letx n ∈ T ñ p,δ and
where the inequality holds, since
it follows that y n ∈ T ñ q,2|X|δ , whereq is the output distribution generated byp andW , and thus
By the continuity of the entropy function it follows by 2.7 in [12] that
with lim δ→0 ϕ(δ) = 0. By the last two inequalities we obtain that
By the proof of Lemma 2.13 it follows that
with ψ(δ) > 0 and lim δ→0 ψ(δ) = 0. Then from (10) by defining f (δ) := ϕ(δ) + ψ(δ) we end up with
The assertion still holds if we replace W by W andp by p throughout the proof.
The last lemma is a standard result from large deviation theory. 
where
Proof. The proof is given in [14] (cf. Theorem 1.1) and in [15] .
CSI at the transmitter
First we consider the case in which the transmitter has full knowledge of the channel state (CSI) while the legitimate receiver has no information about the channel state. The main result in this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5. The secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel W with CSI at the transmitter is given by
Here X t is a random variable with probability distribution in P(A) and U t is an auxiliary random variable with range equals A, such that U t , X t , (Y Z) t form a Markov chain U t → X t → (Y Z) t in this order. Then the maximum refers to all random variables satisfying the Markov chain condition such that X t is connected with Y t respective Z t by the channels W t respective V t for every t ∈ θ.
Notice first that the inequality
is trivially true since we cannot exceed the secrecy capacity of the worst wiretap channel in the family W. This has been already pointed out in [1] . The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the achievability.
Proof. It suffices to prove that min t∈Θ (I(X t , Y t ) − I(X t , Z t )) for (XY Z) t as above is an achievable secrecy rate. Then we will have shown that
Markov chain, is an achievable secrecy rate (cf. [12] page 411). We choose p 1 , . . . , p T ∈ P(A) and define new probability distributions on A n by
Define then for
2 (cf. Lemma 3.1) and α t is from (8) in Lemma 3.2 computed with respect to p t and V t . By lemma 3.2 the support of Θ ′ t has cardinality ≤ α
for τ > 0. Moreover we suppose that the random matrices {X
′ . Now it is obvious from (12) and the definition of the set S that for any z n ∈ S
and keeping in mind that Θ t (z n ) ≥ ǫα t for all z n ∈ S it follows that for all j ∈ [J n ] and for all t ∈ θ
by Lemma 3.4, Lemma 3.2, and our choice ǫ = 2
Thus, for this choice of δ the RHS of (17) is double exponential in n uniformly in t ∈ θ and can be made smaller than ǫJ
n for all j ∈ [J n ] and all sufficiently large n ∈ N. I.e.
Let us turn now to the coding part of the problem. Let p ′ t ∈ P(A n ) be given as in (11) . We abbreviate X := {X (t) } t∈θ for the family of random matrices
We will show now how the reliable transmission of the message j ∈ [J n ] can be achieved when randomising over the index l ∈ L n,t without any attempt to decode the randomisation parameter at the legitimate receiver (see section 4.1). To this end let us define for each j ∈ [J n ] a random set
and the subordinate random decoder
n is given by
Consequently we can define the random average probabilities of error for a specific channel t ∈ θ by
Now (19) implies for each t ∈ θ and l ∈ [L n,t ]
where the second inequality follows by the monotonicity of the probability. By Lemma 3.1 and the independence of all involved random variables we obtain
We shall find now for j ′ = j an upper bound on
By Lemma 3.1 and by Lemma 3.3 for any t, s ∈ θ we have
with a universal f (δ) > 0 satisfying lim δ→0 f (δ) = 0 since X (s)
ps,δ with probability 1. Thus inserting this into (23) we obtain
, and j ∈ [J n ] (22) and (23) lead to
where we have used (15), (14), and we have chosen δ > 0 small enough to ensure that
we can find n(δ, τ, |A|, |B|) ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n(δ, τ, |A|, |B|)
holds for all t ∈ θ, l ∈ [L n,t ], and j ∈ [J n ]. Consequently, for any t ∈ θ we obtain
Additionally we define for any t ∈ θ an event
Then using the Markov inequality applied to λ (t) n (X ) along with (26), we obtain that
Set
Then with (18), (27), and applying the union bound we obtain
In the first term the functions V n t (·|x
, so it makes a contribution of ǫ to the bound. In the second termQ t and Q t are different for z n / ∈ S and because ι j (t) and
the second term is bounded by 3ǫ. The third term is bounded by ǫ which follows directly from (16) . [Ln,t] : t ∈ θ} ∈ ι with the corresponding decoding sets {D j : j ∈ [J n ]} it follows by construction that
is fulfilled for all t ∈ θ with a ′ > 0, which means that we have found a (n, J n ) code with average error probability tending to zero for n ∈ N sufficiently large for any channel realisation. Now by a standard expurgation scheme we show that this still holds for the maximum error probability. We define the set
with η := √ T ·2
−na ′ and denote its complement as B t := G c t and the union of all complements as B = t∈θ B t . Then (30) and (31) imply that
for all t ∈ θ and by the union bound it follows that
After removing all j ∈ B (which are at most a fraction of T
4 2
−n a ′ 2 of J n ) and relabeling we obtain a new (n,J n ) code (E j , D j ) j∈ [Jn] without changing the rate. The maximum error probability of the new code fulfills for sufficiently large n ∈ N
On the other hand, if we setV
and further defineV
we obtain that
where we have used the convexity of the variational distance and (29) which still applies by our expurgation procedure. For a uniformly distributed random variable J taking values in the set {1, . . . ,J n } we obtain with Lemma 2.7 of [12] (uniform continuity of the entropy function)
). Hence the strong secrecy level of the definition 2.1 holds uniformly in t ∈ θ. Using standard arguments (cf. [12] page 411) we then have shown the achievability of the secrecy rate
Remark. Note that in the case that W := {W t , V s : t = 1, . . . T, s = 1, . . . S} with S = T and the pair (s, t) known to the transmitter prior to transmission nothing new happens. A slight modification of the arguments presented above shows that
No CSI
In the previous section we have assumed that the channel state is known to the transmitter. We now consider the case where neither the transmitter nor the receiver has knowledge of the channel state. We will prove that Theorem 3.6. For the secrecy capacity C S (W) of the compound wiretap channel W without CSI it holds that
Proof. Caused by the lack of channel knowledge we use a stochastic encoder independent of the channel realisation. For any p ∈ P(A) let p ′ ∈ P(A n ) be the distribution given by
Then analogously to the case with CSI we defineQ t,x n (z n ), Q t,x n (z n ), and Θ ′ t (z n ), Θ t (z n ) for z n ∈ C n but now with respect to the distribution p ′ . Consequently, Θ ′ (·) has support only on T n pVt,2|A|δ , and Q t,x n (·) and Θ(·) only on the set S. Furthermore Θ(z n ) ≥ ǫα t for all z n ∈ S. Now define J n · L n i.i.d random variables X jl according to the distribution p ′ independent of t ∈ θ with j ∈ [J n ] and l ∈ [L n ] with
for τ > 0. Now because Θ t (z n ) = EQ t,X jl ≥ ǫα t for all z n ∈ S we define the event ι j (t) as in (16) for the random variables β
but considering the difference that the random variables X jl are independent of the channel state. Then analogously to (17) we obtain that
by Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.2. Notice that, because the sender does not know which channel is used, we need the maximum in the definition of L n . Thus the right-hand side is a double exponential in n and can be made smaller than ǫJ
n for all j and for all t ∈ θ and sufficiently large n. Now let J n and L n be defined as stated above, and let X n = {X jl } j∈[Jn],l∈ [Ln] be the set of i.i.d. random variables each of them distributed according to p ′ independent of t ∈ θ. As in the case of CSI we can show that reliable transmission of the message j ∈ [J n ] can be achieved. To this end define now the random decoder
and the random average probabilities of error for a specific channel λ
n (X n ) as in (20). Notice that now both X n and L n do not depend on t ∈ θ and this holds throughout the entire proof. Then we can give the bound in (21) now by
We can bound the first term in the inequality by ν n (δ) := (n + 1)
2 (see (22)). If we average over all codebooks we get
By the same reasoning as in (23) and (24) we can give an upper bound on
for all t ∈ θ, all j ′ = j and all k, l ∈ [L n ] with a universal f (δ) > 0 satisfying lim δ→0 f (δ) = 0. q ⊗n t denotes the output distribution generated by the conditional distribution W ⊗n t and the input distribution p ⊗n . Additionally we define µ n (δ) := 1 − (n + 1) |A| · 2
−ncδ
2 . Then (25) changes to
by the definition of J n and L n in (36), (37) and by choosing δ > 0 small enough that τ −
and the definition of the error probability the last inequality results in the upper bound
for any t ∈ θ and n ∈ N large enough. Now we define the event ι 0 (t) for any t ∈ θ and the event ι as in (26) and (28) but with the difference that the input is independent of the channel realisation. So by the same reasoning we end in
for a constant c ′′ > 0 and all sufficiently large n ∈ N, which implies that there exist realisations {x jl } of {X jl } such that x jl ∈ ι for all j ∈ [J n ] and l ∈ [L n ]. Then analogously to (29) we get for any channel t ∈ θ
differs from the former only by L n in place of L n,t . Hence, following the same arguments subsequent to (30), we have shown that there is a sequence of (n,J n ) codes for which
holds for sufficiently large n ∈ N, and the strong secrecy level is fulfilled for every channel t ∈ θ by (33), (34)) and thus by I(J; Z n t ) ≤ −10ǫ log(10ǫ) + 10nǫ log |C| which tends to zero for n → ∞ uniformly in t ∈ θ.
We turn now to the converse of Theorem 3.6. Actually, we give only a multiletter formula of the upper bound of the secrecy rates. First we need the following lemma. 
exists and we have
where the inequality follows from the data processing inequality. Then using Fano's inequality we find that H(J|Ĵ) ≤ 1 + ε 1,n log J n with (38). Thus we can rewrite inequality (39) as
for all t ∈ θ. On the other hand we have for every t ∈ θ
where we have used the validity of the secrecy criterion stated above. Then the last two inequalities imply that for any t ∈ θ
Since the LHS of (40) does not depend on t we arrive at
which concludes the proof after dividing by n ∈ N, taking lim sup and taking into account the assertion of Lemma 3.7.
Remark. Following the same arguments subsequent to (35) concerning the use of the channels defined by P Yt|T = W t · P X|T and P Zt|T = V t · P X|T instead of W t and V t and applying the assertion of Theorem 3.6 to the n-fold product of channels W t and V t , we can give the coding theorem for the multiletter case. The capacity of the compound wiretap channel in the case of no CSI is
Let us consider now the case W := {W t , V s : t = 1, . . . T, s = 1, . . . S} with S = T and the pair (s, t) unknown to both the transmitter and the legitimate receiver. Additionally we assume that each V s is a degraded version of every W t , which is characterised by
for all x ∈ A, z ∈ C, if D is defined as the stochastic matrix D : B → P(C). Then we have the following Lemma 3.9. Let p ∈ P(A), W : A → P(B), V : A → P(C), and assume that V is a degraded version of W . Then I(X; Y |Z) is a concave with respect to the input distribution p X = p.
Proof. Let X, Y, Z be random variables with values in A, B, C respectively distributed according to
for all x ∈ A, y ∈ B, z ∈ Z. Because
the proof is based on the two assertions 1. H(Y |Z) depends concavely on p X , and
is an affine function of p X . (41) and (42) imply that
First, H(Y |Z
for every input distribution p X , any y ∈ B and all x ∈ A, z ∈ C with p XZ (x, z) > 0. Then we have
showing that H(Y |X, Z) is an affine function of p XZ which in turn depends affinely on p X . Now because the random variables X, Y t , Z s (Y t , Z s the channel outputs of W t and V s resp.) form a Markov chain for all t ∈ θ and s ∈ S, we obtain that
By virtue of Theorem 2 of [17] we can show that for the secrecy rate it holds that
for any channel (t, s) ∈ θ × S and ǫ ′ > 0. The concavity of I(X; Y t |Z s ) with respect to the input distributions p ∈ P(A) together with (43) then imply the converse part of Theorem 3.6, that
Now we can state the following Proposition 3.10. If V s is a degraded version of W t for all s ∈ S and t ∈ θ the capacity of the compound wiretap channel is given by
Remark. This result was obtained in [1] with a weaker notion of secrecy.
Channel state to the legitimate receiver is known at the transmitter (CSI t )
We now consider the case, in which the transmitter has knowledge of the channel state to the legitimate receiver t ∈ θ but the channel state to the eavesdropper s ∈ S is unknown. We will denote this kind of channel state information by CSI t . Consequently we get for each t ∈ θ possible channel realisations W t := {(W t , V s ) : s = 1, . . . S}. Then we can describe the compound channel as W = ∪ t∈θ W t .
Theorem 3.11. For the secrecy capacity C S,CSIt (W) of the compound wiretap channel with CSI t it holds that
Proof. Adapted to the channel realisation W t define
for arbitrary input distributions p 1 , . . . , p T ∈ P(A). Now define for z n ∈ C n and s ∈ S t,s , which implies that z n ∈S Θ s (z n ) ≥ 1 − 2ǫ. Analogously to (13) define Θ s (z n ) and Q s,x n (z n ) with support on S and further
As in the case of CSI define random matrices {X jl } j,l are independent for t = t ′ . For any z n ∈ S it follows that Θ s (z n ) = EQ s,X (t) jl (z n ) ≥ ǫα t,s , if E is the expectation value with respect to the distribution p ′ t . For the random variables β
Then it follows that for all j ∈ [J n ] and for all s ∈ S it holds for each t ∈ θ
3 by Lemma 3.4, Lemma 3.2, Thus the RHS is double exponential in n uniformly in s ∈ S, t ∈ θ (guaranteed by the maximum in s in the definition of L n,t ) and can be made smaller than ǫJ −1 n for all j ∈ [J n ] and all sufficiently large n. Now the coding part of the problem is similar to the case with CSI. Let p ′ t ∈ P(A n ) be given as in (44). We abbreviate X := {X (t) } t∈θ for the family of random matrices X (t) = {X 
As in (21) we get for each t ∈ θ and l ∈ [L n,t ]
Then by Lemma 3.1 we can bound the first term of the right hand side, such that together with the independence of all involved random variables we end up with
We shall find now for j ′ = j by the same reasoning as in (23) and (24) an upper bound on
for all r, t ∈ θ, all j ′ = j, and all l ∈ [L n,t ], k ∈ [L n,r ]. Now by defining ν n (δ) := (n + 1)
, and j ∈ [J n ] (47) and the last inequality leads to
where we have used the definitions of J n and L n,r in (45), (46) and we have chosen δ > 0 small enough to
we can find n(δ, τ, |A|, |B|) ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n(δ, τ, |A|, |B|) we end in
for any t ∈ θ. To give a bound on the average probability of error we define the event ι 0 (t) for any t ∈ θ as in (26) and the event
differs from (28) only by the intersection of the unknown channel states s ∈ S. Thus we can conclude that
holds for a suitable positive constant c ′′ > 0 and all sufficiently large n ∈ N, and we have shown that for each t ∈ θ there exist realisations {(x [Ln,t] : t ∈ θ} ∈ ι of X . By the same reasoning as in (29) we get for any channel realisation t ∈ θ to the legitimate receiver
for each of the unknown channels s ∈ S to the eavesdropper. Now, because for any t ∈ θ we have a different codeword set {x (t) jl }, we slightly change the definition in (32) tô
and accordingly toV n (s,t),j andV n (s,t) in (33), (34) in that way, that these distributions are defined separately for each codeword set t ∈ θ. Thus we get, that
is fulfilled for all s ∈ S for each individual channel t ∈ θ to the legitimate receiver. Hence, using the same expurgation scheme as in the previous sections we have shown that there is a sequence of (n,J n ) codes for which
holds for sufficiently large n ∈ N, and the strong secrecy level is fulfilled for every channel t ∈ θ by I(J; Z n s ) ≤ −10ǫ log(10ǫ) + 10nǫ log |C| which tends to zero for n → ∞ for all channels s ∈ S to the eavesdropper. Thus we have shown that
is an achievable secrecy rate for the compound wiretap channel ∪ t∈θ W t in the case where the channel state to the legitimate receiver is known at the transmitter.
Remark. By considering the converse of Theorem 3.11, we get for each t ∈ θ possible channel realisations
Then we can describe the compound channel as W = ∪ t∈θ W t . In accordance to the case of no CSI for each t ∈ θ we obtain that
Proposition 3.12. The secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel in the case where only the channel state to the legitimate receiver is known at the transmitter C S,CSIt (W) is given by
Now, additionally let us assume that each V s is a degraded version of every W t for s ∈ S and t ∈ θ. Then as shown in Lemma 3.9 I(X; Y t |Z s ) is a concave function with respect to the input distribution p X = p. In particular this still holds for min s∈S I(X; Y t |Z s ). Now because the random variables X, Y t , Z s form a Markov chain for all t ∈ θ and s ∈ S and min s∈S I(X; Y t |Z s ) = I(X, Y t ) − max s∈S I(X, Z s ), for any t ∈ θ we get the upper bound on the secrecy rate as the secrecy capacity of a single channel W t with S channels to the eavesdropper. Then we can conclude Proposition 3.13. The secrecy capacity of the channel where only the channel states to the legitimate receiver are known and the channels to the eavesdropper are degraded versions of those to the legitimate receiver is given by Let W := {W t , V s : t = 1, . . . T, s = 1, . . . S} with S = T and the pair (t, s) unknown to both the transmitter and the legitimate receiver. In addition let us assume that ∃t ∈ θ ∀ t ∈ θ ∃ U t : Wt = U t W t ,
which means that Wt is a degraded version of all channel W t with t =t. We further assume that ∃ŝ ∈ S ∀ s ∈ S ∃Û s : V s =Û s Vŝ,
which means that all V s with s =ŝ are degraded versions of Vŝ. Then we can show that the capacity of this channel equals the capacity of the same channel with CSI at the transmitter, e.g. 
where M is an auxiliary random variable, such that M, X, (Y t , Z s ) form a Markov chain M → X → (Y t Z s ) in this order. Now let
Notice that V 0 is a degraded version of W 0 , W 1 of V 0 , and V 1 of W 1 . Next we define for t ∈ [0, 1]
By the definition, the set of channels to the legitimate receiver {W t } and the set of channels to the eavesdropper {V t } both are convex. Nevertheless we will show now, that for the compound wiretap channel W := {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ [0, 1]} we have C S,CSI (W) > 0, C S (W) = 0.
To this end, note that by (52), fact 3, and fact 2 we have
with f (t, η, τ ) := η + t(2τ − 2τ 2 ) − 2ηt(2τ − 2τ 2 ) ∈ (0, 1 2 ).
Similarly from (53) and fact 2 we obtain
Additionally from (54) and fact 2 we get τ + f (t, η, τ ) − 2τ f (t, η, τ ) ∈ (0, 1 2 ) and τ + f (t, η, τ ) − 2τ f (t, η, τ ) > f (t, η, τ ).
Taking p = (1/2, 1/2) we obtain for every t ∈ [0, 1]
I(p, W t ) − I(p, V t ) = h(τ + f (t, η, τ ) − 2τ f (t, η, τ )) − h(f (t, η, τ )) > 0 where the last inequality follows from fact 1 and (55). Thus we have shown that C S,CSI (W) > 0 holds by Theorem 3.5. In order to show that C S (W) = 0, we have to employ our multiletter converse in the case of no CSI, Proposition 3.8. First, a simple algebra shows that for any t ∈ [0, 1] V t = ((1 − t)D 0 + tD 2τ −2τ 2 )V 0 by (53) and thus each V t is a degraded version of V 0 . Let us now consider the Markov chain U → X n → (Y n t , Z n t ) where the transition from the random variable U to Y n t is governed by P Y n t |U = V ⊗n t · P X n |U for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Then we obtain that each P Y n t |U is a degraded version of P Y n 0 |U = V ⊗n 0 · P X n |U , and the data processing inequality implies that for each n ∈ N 
for all distributions P UX n that satisfy the Markov chain condition U → X n → (Y n t , Z n t ). On the other hand, since W 1 = D τ V 0 we obtain for the matrix P Z n 1 |U = W ⊗n 1 · P X n |U by the data processing inequality and (56) for all n ∈ N I(U, Z 
